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Collective Security Treaties and the
Ability of Allies to Limit the Movement




Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances,
with any portion of the foreign world. There can be no greater
error than to expect, or calculate upon real favours from Nation
to Nation.'
It was in this manner that George Washington in his Farewell
Address warned the new United States of the debility in the nature
of agreements between nations.
By the end of World War II, however, presidential views re-
garding international agreements had changed. Indeed, in 1947 Pres-
ident Harry S Truman advocated that the United States become in-
volved in alliances to help "free peoples everywhere . . . maintain
their institutions and their national integrity against aggressive
movements that [attempt] to impose on them totalitarian govern-
ment."2 As a result, in 1948 with the support of Congress and within
the framework of the United Nations Charter, the United States
adopted an alliance policy s for the purpose of protecting itself and
1. Farewell Address by George Washington (Sept. 19, 1796) in 35 THE WRITINGS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON 234, 235-36 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1940). Washington elaborated on the
problems he saw in the nature of alliances:
Harmony, liberal intercourse with all Nations, are recommended by policy,
humanity and interest . . constantly keeping in view, that 'tis folly in one Na-
tion to look for disinterested favours from another; that it must pay with a por-
tion of its Independence for whatever it may accept under that character; that
by such acceptance, it may place itself in the condition of having given
equivalents for nominal favours and yet being reproached with ingratitude for
not giving more.
Id. at 235.
2. J. GRENVILLE, THE MAJOR INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 1914-1973 at 306 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as GRENVILLE]. Truman's statement was triggered by the preponderance of
Soviet troops in Europe and the aid the communists were giving to Greek guerrillas in the
Greek Civil War. Id. at 305.
3. See T. IRELAND, CREATING THE ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 92-100 (1981). The
United States Senate was not too comfortable with the idea of involving the United States in
the "entangling" alliance then being proposed for the North Atlantic area. The Vandenburg
Resolution of 1948 embodied the spirit of that noncommital attitude. Senator Vandenburg
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others against potential future military threats.
As part of this overall pro-alliance policy, the United States in
1951 negotiated a treaty with Australia and New Zealand for the
purpose of securing peace in the Pacific area. This treaty, known as
the ANZUS Treaty, 4 is characteristic of the collective security
agreements entered into by the United States since the end of World
War II.
B. The Problem
On February 4, 1985, the U.S.S. Buchanan, a conventionally
powered United States Navy destroyer, was denied port access by
New Zealand. 5 The denial was pursuant to a policy adopted by New
Zealand's Labor Party forbidding any nuclear armed or nuclear pro-
pelled ships from entering its waters.' The Buchanan was denied ac-
cess because the United States would not reveal if the ship was car-
rying nuclear arms.7
The United States immediately considered retaliatory measures
against New Zealand. 8 In addition, and in direct protest against
New Zealand's treatment of her ally, the United States and Austra-
lia agreed to postpone the annual meeting of the ANZUS Council. 9
New Zealand's action with regard to the U.S.S. Buchanan and the
responses from the United States and Australia raised grave ques-
tions regarding the continued validity of the ANZUS Treaty.10
stated, "I think the great gain to us on the one hand is that we have moved forward into the
field of security without involving ourselves in any permanent obligations of any nature." Id. at
93; see also infra text accompanying note 104.
4. Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States, Sept. 1,
1951, Australia-New Zealand-United States, 3 U.S.T. 3421, T.I.A.S. No. 2493. See also infra
notes 43-54 and accompanying text.
5. N.Y. Times Feb. 5, 1985, at Al, col. 1.
6. Id. The Labor Party was elected to office in July 1984 on a platform of a nuclear-
free South Pacific. The Labor Parties in both Australia and New Zealand have long been
antinuclear advocates. See infra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
7. N.Y. Times, supra note 5.
8. The United States cut back and proposed suspending the sharing of intelligence
and other security information, ending preferential treatment for New Zealand lamb, wool,
and casein, and releasing for sale on the world market of surplus American dairy products,
which could hurt New Zealand's sale of those products. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1985, at A8,
col. 4; N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1985 at A13, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1985, at Al, col. 1.
9. N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1985, at A3, col. 6. The ANZUS Council was established
under Article VII of the ANZUS Treaty and generally met on an annual basis at either
Canberra, Australia, Wellington, New Zealand, or Washington, D.C. Meetings were informal
and dealt with a variety of issues, usually concerning peace and security in the Pacific area.
The Reagan Administration was concerned with the effect of New Zealand's actions on
other allied countries, especially countries maintaining policies concerning nuclear weapons.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1985, at Al, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1985, at Al, col. 1. For example,
Japan maintains a policy stating that it will not 1) produce; 2) possess; or 3) introduce nuclear
weapons. Included under "introduction" is the storage of nuclear weapons at U.S. military
bases in Japan, port calls or landings by U.S. ships or planes carrying nuclear arms, and the
transit of nuclear-armed ships and planes through Japan's territorial seas and air space. The
Nuclear Policy of the Japanese Government, 28 JAPAN Q. 461 at 461, 463 (1981).
10. Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger stated that New Zealand's action
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C. Scope
Using the ANZUS Treaty as an example, this comment will
determine the extent of a state's ability to limit the movements of
the military forces of an ally in the face of a collective security
agreement that appears to contemplate the mobilization of military
forces in preparation for the exercise of the defensive rights of both
the state and the ally. The comment will begin by giving some back-
ground on the general nature of collective security treaties. It will
also describe the events that led up to the signing of the ANZUS
Treaty. In the next section the rules of interpretation applied to trea-
ties will be outlined. Finally, those rules will be applied to the text
included in most collective security agreements, as exemplified by
the ANZUS Treaty. From this application and analysis the extent of
a state's power under a collective security agreement with an ally to
limit within its own territory the movements of that ally's forces will
be determined.
II. The Collective Security Treaty
A. Nature of Treaties in General
A treaty, as a generic term, is an agreement.11 By nature, each
treaty as an agreement consists of three distinct aspects.12 The first
is that of a contractual agreement which is entered into through the
creation of the treaty. Therefore in most respects the general princi-
ples of contracts apply. 3 Second, the agreement must be concluded
"constitutes a serious attack upon the alliance." N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1985 at Al, Col. 1.
Congressman Stephen J. Solarz agreed by stating that New Zealand's action "raised the grav-
est questions concerning the future of the alliance." N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1985, at A13, col. 1.
II. See United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, second
session at 3, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/11 add. I [hereinafter cited as Law of Treaties]; E.
BODEHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 334 (1974); J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 195 (2d ed.
1936) [hereinafter cited as BRIERLY]; L. MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 3 (1961) [hereinaf-
ter cited as McNAIR]; 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 877 (H. Lauterpaucht ed.
1948) [hereinafter cited as OPPENHEIM]; Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, 61 AM. J.
INT'L L., 263 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Draft Articles]; Jessup, Modernization of the Law
of International Contractual Agreements, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 378, 392 (1947); Harvard Re-
search in International Law, Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. INT'L L.
Supp. 653 (1935).
The International Law Commission (ILC) was created by the General Assembly of the
United Nations on November 21, 1947 pursuant to Article 13, para. 1(a) of the Charter of the
United Nations. G.A. Res. 174 (11), U.N. Doc. A/519, at 105 (1947). The function of the
ILC is two-fold. It promotes both the progressive development and the codification of interna-
tional law. Statute of the International Law Commission, G.H. Res. 174 (II), art. 1 Doc. A/
519 at 105 (1947); see also id. arts. 15-24, at 107-09. The Draft Articles and the Law of
Treaties supra, are codifications by the ILC of the international law of treaties. These codifica-
tions are used throughout this comment as being representational of the international law of
treaties. For a more in depth explanation of the ILC see generally H. BRIGGS, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW COMMISSION (1965).
12. See generally supra note 11.
13. BRIERLY, supra note II, at 195; MCNAIR, supra note 11; Read, International
Agreements, 26 CAN. B. REV. 520, 521 (1948).
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between states. 14 Only states are considered to be international per-
sons with the capacity to conclude treaties. The third aspect is that
the agreement entered into through the treaty and the relationship
created by it must be established under international law." This last
aspect distinguishes a treaty from agreements regulated by private
international law and from agreements regulated by the national law
of one of the parties to the agreement." This aspect also establishes
international law as the law governing the validity, binding force,
interpretation, application, and termination of the treaty.
17
Another maxim of international law applicable to treaties is
that both parties are bound by a principle of good faith known as
pacta sunt servanda.18 The preamble of the United Nations Charter,
for example, speaks of "obligations arising from treaties,"1 9 obliga-
tions which the Charter states shall be fulfilled in "good faith"20 by
all members.
The scope of pacta sunt servanda, as the maxim was originally
developed, extended to all parts of the treaty with no part being
more or less important than any other.2 1 This scope, however, has
been limited to the material parts of treaties.2
Pacta sunt servanda also extends to those treaties which indi-
cate an intention by the parties to create legal rights and obligations
or to establish relations governed by international law.2 3 The parties'
intent may be expressly or inferentially determined.
By contrast, if no intent exists the treaty is without legal effect.
By definition, therefore, a non-binding treaty is outside the scope of
14. See generally supra note 11. Among the classes of treaties not falling within the
scope of this criterion were agreements concluded between states and international organiza-
tions or between two or more international organizations. Law of Treaties, supra note 11.
15. See generally supra note 11.
16. Draft Articles. supra note 11, at 289.
17. W. FRIEDMANN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 301 (1969).
18. See BRIERLY, supra note 11, at 201; McNAIR, supra note 11, at 493; OPPENHEIM,
supra note 11, at 794. Lord McNair explained it as such:
In every uncodified legal system there are certain elementary and Univer-
sally agreed principles for which it is almost impossible to find specific authority.
In the Common Law of England and the United States of America, where can
you find specific authority for the principle that a man must perform his con-
tracts? Yet almost every decision on a contract presupposes the existence of that
principle. The same is true of international law.
McNAIR, supra note 11, at 493.
19. U.N. CHARTER preamble.
20. Id. at art. 2, para. 2.
21. OPPENHEIM, supra note 11, at 829.
22. See Law of Treaties, supra note 11, art. 57 at 111; Draft Articles, supra note 11,
art. 57 at 279. As part of the pacta sunt servanda principle the Commission also considers it
implicit that the parties refrain from acts calculated to frustrate the object and purpose of the
treaty. Draft Articles, supra note 11, at 335 (commentary on article 23 of the Draft Articles
of the Law of Treaties).
23. The Twilight Existence of Non-Binding International Agreements, 71 AM. J. INT'L




The key to understanding treaties is that they are created by the
intent of the parties, and exist through good faith. Therefore, the
sole objective of treaty interpretation is to give effect to the intention
of the parties.
2 5
B. Development of the Collective Security Treaty
A collective security treaty is an agreement that seeks to create
peaceful relations among party states and provides for collective par-
ticipation in preventing threats to the peace of the nations which are
party to the agreement.26
There are three principal United Nations theories in support of
the existence of collective security treaties. First, they are justified as
collective measures undertaken by groups of individual states in or-
der to maintain international peace and security pursuant to article
1(1) of the United Nations Charter;27 second, they are justified as
measures of individual or collective self-defense within the meaning
of article 51 ;2a and third, they are considered to be within the defini-
tion of "regional arrangements" established to maintain interna-
tional peace and security under articles 52 through 54.29
24. Id. at 296, 300. The parties have the ability to make the language as precise as
they would like and therefore vague language may reasonably be indicative of an intention to
avoid legal effect. Id. at 297; see McNAIR, supra note II arts. 43-49, at 85-92.
25. BRIERLY, supra note 11, at 199; MCNAIR, supra note 11, at 365; see infra notes
57-100 and accompanying text.
26. Fenwick, Collective Security and the London Agreements, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 54,
54 (1955); see infra notes 30-41 and accompanying text. The collective security treaty as it
has developed since World War II must be distinguished from the military alliance. The mili-
tary alliance is a treaty of union between two or more states which bind those states to mili-
tary cooperation to defend against the attack of a specific state or states or for jointly attack-
ing their states. OPPENHEIM, supra note 11, at 864; R. Osgood, The Nature of Alliances 2
(available in the United States Army War College Library of Military History). For example,
the alliance created between Germany and Turkey in 1914 was expressly directed against
Russia and it obligated each party to defend Ottoman territory by force of arms. Secret Treaty
of Alliance between Germany and the Ottoman Empire, Aug. 2, 1914, reprinted in
GRENVILLE, supra note 2, at 24.
27. R. CHOWDHURY, MILITARY ALLIANCES AND NEUTRALITY IN WAR AND PEACE 65
(1966) [hereinafter cited as CHOWDHURYJ; see N. BENTWICH & A. MARTIN, COMMENTARY
ON THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 5-6 (1950) [hereinafter cited as BENTWICH &
MARTIN]. In pertinent part the Charter states, "The Purposes of the United Nations are: 1. To
maintain peace and security and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the pre-
vention and removal of threats to the peace." U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
28. CHOWDHURY, supra note 27; see BENTWICH & MARTIN, supra note 27, at 106-08.
In pertinent part the Charter states, "Nothing in this present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense." U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
29. CHOWDHURY, supra note 27; see BENTWICH & MARTIN, supra note 27 at 109-15.
Article 52 states, "Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrange-
ments or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international
peace and security." U.N. CHARTER art. 52, para. 1. Article 53 provides for the use of such
regional arrangements by the Security Council. See BENTWICH & MARTIN, supra note 27, at
113.
Article 54 simply creates an obligation on the part of regional organizations to keep the
Security Council fully informed of regional activities. id. at 115.
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C. Purposes and Principles
The overriding purpose and principle of collective security trea-
ties is the maintenance of international peace and security.30 For
those collective security agreements concluded in light of the pur-
poses and principles of the United Nations Charter the maintenance
of peace necessarily must be a fundamental principle, because absent
the existence of peace, no other aspect of the agreements could be
attained.31
There exist two corollaries to the principle of maintaining inter-
national peace and security. The first requires the coordination of the
defense efforts of the contracting states.32 The second requires the
assurance of the peaceful settlement of any disputes which may arise
among the contracting states.
33
The coordination of defense efforts is manifested by a commit-
ment among the contracting states to take action in the event of a
threat to one of the states.3 4 A threat, termed casus foederis, gener-
ally arises in the form of an armed attack.
35
Defense efforts also include measures taken in preparation for
the exercise of the right to collective security.36 For example, collec-
tive security agreements have established security through the mu-
30. See Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Jan. 19, 1960, United States-
Japan, preamble, paras. 1, 3, 1 U.S.T. 1632, T.I.A.S. No. 4509 [hereinafter cited as U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty]; South East Asia Collective Defense Treaty, Sept. 8, 1954, preamble, paras.
2, 4, 6 at 6 U.S.T. 81 T.I.A.S, No. 3170, 209 U.N.T.S. 23 [hereinafter cited as SEATO
Treaty]; Pacific Charter, Sept. 8, 1954, preamble, para. 2 at 6 U.S.T. 91, T.I.A.S. No. 3171,
209 U.N.T.S. 23; Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States,
Sept. 1, 1951, Australia-New Zealand-United States, preamble, paras. 1, 2, 5 at 3 U.S.T.
3421, T.I.A.S. No. 2493 [hereinafter cited as ANZUS Treaty]; North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4,
1949, preamble, paras. 1, 4, 63 Stat. 2241, T.I.A.S. No. 1964, 34 U.N.T.S. 243; Inter-Ameri-
can Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, preamble, para. 7, 62 Stat. 1681, T.I.A.S.
No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77 [hereinafter cited as Rio Treaty]; cf. Treaty of Friendship, Coopera-
tion and Mutual Assistance, May 15, 1955, preamble, paras. 1, 3, 5, 219 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Warsaw Pact].
31. The Charter of the United Nations states as its first purpose "to maintain interna-
tional peace and security." U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1. See BENTWICH & MARTIN, supra
note 27, at 5-6.
32. SEATO Treaty, supra note 30, at preamble, para. 6; ANZUS Treaty, supra note
30, at preamble, para. 5; North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 30, at preamble, para. 4; see also
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, supra note 30, at preamble, paras. 4, 5 (recognizing an inherent
right of collective self-defense); Pacific Charter, supra note 30, at preamble, para. 2 (establish-
ing a basis for common action to maintain peace and security); Rio Treaty, supra note 32, at
preamble, para. 7 (providing for effective reciprocal assistance to meet armed attacks).
33. U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, supra note 30, at art. I; SEATO Treaty, supra note
30, at art. I; Pacific Charter, supra note 30, at procl. 1; ANZUS Treaty, supra note 30, at art.
1; North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 30, at art. 1; Rio Treaty, supra note 30, at preamble,
para. 4, art. 2.
34. U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, supra note 30, at art. V; SEATO Treaty, supra note
30, at art. IV; Pacific Charter, supra note 30, at procl. 4; ANZUS Treaty, supra note 30, at
art. IV; North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 30, at art. 5; Rio Treaty, supra note 30, at art. 3.
35. See supra note 34; OPPENHEIM, supra note 11, at 868.
36. U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, supra note 30, at art. I1; SEATO Treaty, supra note
30, at art. II; ANZUS Treaty, supra note 30, at art. II; North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 30,
at art. 3.
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tual provision of economic assistance among contracting states.37
Thus the concept of defense includes more than military assistance.
The commitment to peaceful settlement of disputes among con-
tracting states as required by article 1(1) of the United Nations
Charter is manifested in two ways: either by the establishment of
consultative status 8 or by agreement between the contracting states
to submit every interstate controversy to some method of peaceful
settlement.3 9 This commitment to peaceful settlement is the key fac-
tor which distinguishes collective security agreements from military
alliances.
40
It is important to recognize that the division of the principle of
maintaining peace is two-pronged. Actions among contracting states
must be analyzed both in relation to preventing external threats and
also in relation to promoting internal harmony within the contracting
group. Specifically, the ANZUS Treaty clearly exemplifies this idea
that maintaining peace, through collective security treaties, is a
double pronged principle.41
D. ANZUS
The Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the
United States, signed on September 1, 1951, is a short document
4
that seeks to "strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific." ' While
the desire for a Pacific Pact had existed for some time," the
ANZUS treaty was generally viewed as a method of allaying those
factions in New Zealand and Australia which opposed a softened
peace treaty with Japan following World War 11:11 At the signing of
the ANZUS Treaty World War II had been over for only six years.
Australia and New Zealand were therefore reluctant to sign a peace
treaty with Japan without some assurance from the United States
that peace would be preserved in the Pacific.4 6 This reluctance ex-
37. U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, supra note 30, at preamble, para. 2; SEATO Treaty,
supra note 30, at art. I1; Pacific Charter, supra note 30, at proc. 3.
38. "Consultative status" denotes a relationship wherein the contracting parties confer
among themselves in discussing and solving problems whether internal or external. See, e.g.,
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, supra note 30, at art. IV; ANZUS Treaty, supra note 30, at arts.
Ill, VII, VIii; North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 30, at arts. 4, 9.
39. Rio Treaty, supra note 30, at art. 2.
40. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
41. For more details concerning these characteristics see infra text accompanying notes
48-54.
42. The ANZUS Treaty contains only eleven articles.
43. ANZUS Treaty, supra note 30, at preamble, 1st recital.
44. In 1936 a sub-committee of the Australian Cabinet sought to promote a regional
agreement and pact of nonagression in the Pacific area. J. STARKE, THE ANZUS TREATY
ALLIANCE 4 (1965); see generally id. at 4-27.
45. See id at 63-64; STEBBINS, THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS 1951, at 183,
199-200 (1952).
46. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. There was no provision within the
twenty-six articles of the Peace Treaty with Japan which limited its ability to rearm. See
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plains why the Peace Treaty with Japan was signed by Australia and
New Zealand only after the ANZUS Treaty was concluded with the
United States.
47
The operative article of the ANZUS Treaty provides that an
"armed attack in the Pacific on any of the Parties" is to be consid-
ered a threat to the peace and safety of the remaining parties." In
the event of such an attack each Party "declares that it would act to
meet the common danger."4 9
The ANZUS Treaty also established a council "to consider
matters concerning the implementation of [the] Treaty." 5 The
council is one aspect of the consultative relationship created by the
agreement that was a key element of the ANZUS Treaty. Other
provisions of the Treaty further define the consultive relationship.
Article III provided that the Parties "will consult" 51 at times when
"in the opinion of"52 the Parties the peace and security in the Pacific
has been threatened. Regarding the internal harmony of the rela-
tionship created, the Parties agreed to the peaceful settlement of dis-
putes in which they may be involved, 53 and obligated themselves to
provide "self-help and mutual aid" in developing their defense
capacity.54
III. The Ability to Act
A. The Quest for Intent
Conceptually, treaties are agreements, 55 agreements that are
products of discussions and negotiations among contracting states.
Through communications the parties seek to reach a common ground
of interests and objectives. The nature of the word "treaty" is that of
a meeting of the minds, or an expression of common intention be-
tween two or more parties.6 6 In interpreting treaties the objective
must therefore be to give effect to the common intention of the par-
ties57 in light of the surrounding circumstances. 5 Strict adherence to
Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169, T.I.A.S. No. 2490. Cf. Treaty of
Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, June 28, 1919, at arts. 159-98,
reprinted in GRENVILLE, supra note 2, at 59 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Versailles] (ex-
pressly demobilizing Germany's military forces).
47. Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 46; ANZUS Treaty, supra note 30.
48. ANZUS Treaty, supra note 30, at art. IV.
49. id.
50. Id. at art. VII.
51. Id. at art. III.
52. id.
53. Id. at art. 1.
54. Id. at art. II; see infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
56. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 62 (5th ed. 1979).
57. BRIERLY, supra note 11, at 199; M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL AND J. MILLER,
THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 40 (1967); MCNAIR,
[Vol. 4:1
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the established rules of interpretation is not enough.
A major caveat in attempting to ascertain a common intention
is that one may not exist.59 There may be a lack of common inten-
tion because the parties consciously did not reach a mutual under-
standing or because the parties mistakenly believed that a common
intention existed when in fact it did not." Parties to a treaty may, in
good faith, simply attach different meanings to the terms of an
agreement or they may have failed to consider the possibility of cer-
tain situations occurring. In addition, states may use language in a
treaty, not to express a desired common intention, but to conceal the
failure of the parties to concur. The states may deliberately assign
different meanings to the text or provide that the intentions be deter-
mined by subsequent agreements.61 The strict application of estab-
lished rules of interpretation in order to ascertain the intention of the
parties may therefore assign to a treaty a common intent which did
not exist.
B. The Plain Meaning
The common intent of the contracting parties to a treaty is de-
termined by a hierarchic structure of interpretational rules.62 Fore-
most is the rule that a treaty is to be interpreted according to the
"plain meaning" given its language.63
The International Law Commission6" (ILC) based this rule on
supra note 11; J. STONE, OF LAW AND NATIONS 171 (1974). See also supra text accompany-
ing note 25.
58. McNAIR, supra note 11, at 366; STONE, supra note 57; Grieg, The Interpretation
of Treaties and Article IV.2 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 6 AUST. Y. B. INT'L L.
77, 83 (1978).
59. STONE, supra note 57. Correspondingly, the concept of treaty interpretation also
includes the assumption that if a common intent exists between the contracting parties, it can
be ascertained by the interpretor. Id.
60. See id. at 172; see also Jessup, supra note 11, at 391 (in interpreting agreements
one must always bear in mind that the parties are free to employ words in any sense they
choose). The point of this caveat is that implicit in the term "intention" is the right to intend
not to intend.
61. STONE, supra note 57, at 172-73. Professor Stone credits Professor Lauterpaucht
with listing five situations when parties may lack common intention, and the suggested solution
to these situations. These are when 1) there was a good faith attachment of different meanings
to the text for which Lauterpaucht suggests that the court's task is to discover the common
intention of the treaty taken in its entirety; 2) the parties deliberately designed different mean-
ings to the text for which the court's task is to assume the common intention required by good
faith; 3) the divergence of views is to be determined by subsequent agreements for which the
courts are bound to assume an effective common intention; 4) the subject matter simply was
not present to the minds of the parties, which constitutes casus omissus and must also be
assumed to involve an effective common intention; and 5) when the parties included terms
which are now contradictory in relation to the present subject matter for which effective inten-
tion again is to be assumed.
62. See Law of Treaties, supra note 1I, at 57-59; McNAIR, supra note HI, at chs.
XIX-XXIX; Draft Articles, supra note 11, at arts. 27, 28. These rules are analogous to the
rules of construction used in interpreting most written documents.
63. See Draft Articles, supra note 11, at art. 27(1).
64. See supra note 11.
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 4:1
the idea that "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accor-
dance with the ordinary meaning to be given the terms of the treaty
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."65 Looking
beyond the language of the treaty, then, is a secondary step in the
overall exercise of interpreting a treaty. 66
It is obvious that in attempting to determine the "plain mean-
ing" of a treaty one must look first to the language. In doing so, it
becomes the interpreter's duty to apply the meaning of the text if it
is clear on its face. 67 A problem with the "plain meaning" test, how-
ever, is that the parties are free to use words in whatever way they
wish.68 In looking for the plain meaning from an interpretational
viewpoint one therefore looks for the meaning those terms have "in
the mouth of a normal speaker." 69 This approach often leads to
problems of semantics.
An additional problem with the "plain meaning" test is that it
assumes that each of the words used in a treaty are autonomous in
meaning. 0 Such an assumption is erroneous. Each word often has
several meanings.71 To determine which is applicable, the words
must be read and interpreted in the context of the treaty as a
whole,72 unless this approach leads to an unreasonable result.
73
In its Law of Treaties, the ILC adopted the contextual ap-
proach to determining the meaning of the language of a treaty. Arti-
cle 27(2) of the Law of Treaties defines what comprises the "con-
text" for purposes of the interpretation of a treaty.74 It is important
to note that the "context" includes the text, preamble, and an-
65. id.
66. Id. at arts. 27(3), 38.
67. The Permanent Court of International Justice stated that in interpreting a treaty,
the Court "[hlaving before it a clause which leaves little to be denied in the nature of clear-
ness, it is bound to apply this clause as its stands." Acquisition of Polish Nationalty, (Ger.-
Pol.), 1923 P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 7 at 20 (Advisory Opinion of Sept. 15). Article 3, paragraph
2, of the Treaty of Lausanne (Turkey-Iraq), 1925 P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 12 at 19 (Advisory
Opinion of Nov. 12) ("the court must ... in the first place, endeavor to ascertain from the
wording of this clause what the intention of the contracting parties was").
68. STONE, supra note 57, at 184.
69. Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REv. 417, 417-18
(1899). Justice Holmes stated:
[W]e ask, not what this man meant, but what those words would mean in
the mouth of a normal speaker of English, using them in the circumstances in
which they were used, and it is to the end of answering this last question that we
let in evidence as to what the circumstances were.
70. STONE, supra note 57, at 183.
71. Holmes, supra note 69, at 417; STONE, supra note 57, at 185.
72. Draft Articles, supra note 11 at art. 27(1).
73. Polish Postal Service in Danzig (Pol. v. Danzig), 1925 P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 11 at 39
(Advisory Opinion of May 16); International Labor Organization (U.K. v. Fr.) 1922 P.C.I.J.,
seT. B, Nos. 2 & 3, at 23 (Advisory Opinion of Aug. 12).
74. Draft Articles, supra note 11, at art. 27(2). According to the ILC, paragraph 2
proposed that related agreements and instruments should not be treated merely as possible
evidence in resolving an ambiguity, but as part of the context to which recourse must be had in
arriving at the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty. Id. at 356.
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nexes. 7 5 The Commission stated that two other classes of documents
- related agreements and instruments - should also be considered
a formative part of the "context." 6
C. Beyond the Plain Meaning
Treaty interpretation goes beyond looking to the plain meaning
of the terms of an agreement. The second tier of the rules of inter-
pretation requires that the interpreter consider the subsequent con-
duct of the parties, ascertain the scope of interpretation in light of
the relevant rules of international law, and study the preparatory
work of the parties.
Article 27(3) of the Law of Treaties states "[tihere shall be
taken into account together with the context [a]ny subsequent agree-
ment between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty
. . . [and] [a]ny subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the understanding of parties regarding its interpre-
tation. 77 Conduct must be taken into consideration as an indication
of the intention of the parties,7 8 for it constitutes objective evidence
of the understanding of the parties pertaining to the meaning of the
treaty.
79
The use of subsequent conduct in interpreting treaties, of
course, is ancillary to the text. Subsequent conduct serves only as
additional evidence regarding the meaning attached to the text and
is not, by itself, conclusive.80 However, a consistent subsequent prac-
tice which establishes the common consent of the parties to the ap-
plication of certain provisions of a treaty in a manner different than
that originally established may modify the treaty."
Article 27(3)(c) of the Law of Treaties states "[t]here shall be
taken into account together with the context . . . [a]ny relevant
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the par-
ties." 2 Accordingly, the scope of the interpretation of the language
is governed by the rules of international law.
On one end of the international legal spectrum is the rule of
international interpretation stating that a document is to be given
75. Id.
76. See supra note 22.
77. Draft Articles, supra note 11, at art. 27(3)(a) and (b).
78. Air Transport Arbitration (U.S.-Italy) reprinted in 4 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 974, 983
(Sept. 1965).
79. Draft Articles, supra note 11, at 356.
80. Air Transport Arbitration, supra note 78.
81. Draft Articles, supra note 11, at 385-86. Article 38 states: "A treaty may be modi-
fied by subsequent practice in the application of the treaty establishing the agreement of the
parties to modify its provisions." Id. at art. 38.
82. Id. at art. 27(3)(c).
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effect rather than be destroyed.83 This general rule of interpretation
is embodied in Article 27(1) of the Law of Treaties."' Article 27 is
based on the view that the text is presumed to be the authentic ex-
pression of the intention of the parties.8 5 Thus the choice allowed
under this rule is not between "effectiveness" and "destruction" but
between degrees of effectiveness.
On the other end of the spectrum is the principle of restrictive
interpretation which states that treaty obligations must be construed
restrictively in favor of sovereignty.8 Where provisions of a treaty
might be interpreted as imposing a greater or lesser obligation on a
state, those provisions shall be construed as imposing the lesser obli-
gation.8 7 Restrictive interpretation is to be applied only when all
other methods of interpretation leaves the intention of the parties
still unclear. 88
Last, the second tier of interpretation involves an analysis of the
preparatory work surrounding the conclusion of the treaty.8 9 Where
the plain meaning derived from the text is not clear it may be useful
to resort to the preparatory work involved in adopting the agreement
to clarify its meaning.90
The ILC adopted the use of preparatory work in interpreting
treaties under Article 28 of the Law of Treaties. 91 The Commission
83. The principle of "effectiveness" is embodied in the maxim ut res magis valeat
quam pereat which means "that the thing may rather have effect than be destroyed." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 1386 (5th ed. 1979).
84. Draft Articles, supra note 11, at art. 27(1).
85. Id. at 354.
86. Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (Fr.-Switz.) 1932 P.C.I.J., ser.
A/B, No. 46, at 167 (Judgment of June 7); STONE, supra note 57, at 180.
87. STONE, supra note 57, at 180.
88. International Commission of the River Oder (Czech. v. Den.), 1929 P.C.I.J., ser.
A, No. 23, at 26 (Judgment of Sept. 10). The need for caution in applying the principle of
restrictive interpretation rises out of the fact that a treaty by nature is a document that creates
rights and duties among the parties. One party's duties are correlative to the rights of some
other party. To the extent treaty interpretation restricts the duties of one party, it also restricts
the rights of another. STONE, supra note 57, at 181.
89. Resort to preparatory work is embodied in the principle travaux preparatoires.
90. Treatment of Polish Nationals and other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in the
Danzig Territory (Danzig v. Pol.), 1932 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 44, (Advisory Opinion of Feb.
4).
Professor Lauterpaucht explained that it was necessary to resort to travaux preparatoires
in treaty interpretation because "[a] purely grammatical or logical interpretation is one which
leaves [a] larger scope to unfettered judicial reasoning and to [the] freedom of judicial con-
struction than one which takes into account the objective factors as given by extrinsic evi-
dence." Lauterpaucht, Some Observations on Preparatory Work in the Interpretation of Trea-
ties, 58 HARV. L. REV. 549, 574 (1935).
Oliver Wendell Holmes, in general explained:
[W]e let in evidence of intention not to help out what theory recognizes as
an uncertainty of speech, and to read what the writer meant into what he has
tried but failed to say, but, recognizing that he has spoken with theoretical cer-
tainty, we inquire what he meant in order to find out what he said.
Holmes, supra note 68, at 418.
91. In pertinent part "[rlecourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation,
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion." Draft
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felt it necessary, however, to limit the use of preparatory work to two
purposes. First, preparatory work could be used to confirm the mean-
ing which resulted from applying the rules contained in Article 27.92
Second, preparatory work could be used for the purpose of determin-
ing the meaning of a treaty when application of the rules under Arti-
cle 27 left that meaning ambiguous or led to absurd or unreasonable
results.9 3 In either case the resort to preparatory work must be sup-
plementary. 94 It was not to be an autonomous means of interpreta-
tion, but an aid to interpretation guided by the principles outlined in
Article 27.
95
The propriety of using preparatory work is still unsettled.9 It
has been argued that preparatory work should never be excluded
from the interpretation of treaties as it provides information about
the state of minds of the member parties, which in turn aids in dis-
covering their intention. 97 But, there may not always be a direct cor-
relation between the preparatory work and the treaty.98 Accordingly,
international courts have held that they will not resort to the use of
preparatory work unless they doubt the plain meaning of the treaty,
and must confirm the result. 99 Preparatory work may never be used
to change the plain meaning of a text.100
These are the rules which constitute the search for intent of the
parties when interpreting treaties. The following is a study of how
the rules apply in the determination of the intentions of parties who
are dealing with a most fundamental aspect of a government's exis-
tence - maintaining peace and security, specifically, by means of
collective security treaties.
Articles, supra note 11, at art. 28.
92. Id. at cl. 3.
93. Id. at cI. 4, (l)-(b).
94. Id. at cl. I.
95. Draft Articles, supra note II at 360.
96. Professor Jessup explained that the source of this debate is the joint participation of
both civil and common law jurists in the development of international law. Jessup, supra note
I1, at 391.
97. STONE, supra note 57, at 176; Lauterpaucht, The Theory of Legal Interpretation,
48 HARv. L. REV. 549, 571 (1935). This approach is based on the idea that nothing is abso-
lutely clear in itself; words and expressions have many meanings.
98. Sir Eric Beckett found fault with Professor Lauterpaucht's stand on travaux
preparatoires and argued that Lauterpaucht's theory failed to account for possible com-
promises made behind closed doors of which there is no record. See STONE, supra note 57, at
176-77.
99. See, e.g., S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 16 (Judg-
ment of Sept. 7); Jurisdiction of the European Danube Commission between Galatz and
Bralia, 1927 P.C.l.J., ser. B, No. 14 at 28 (Advisory Opinion of Dec. 8); Article 3, para. 2, of
the Treaty of Lausanne (Turk. v. Iraq), 1925 P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 12 at 23 (Advisory Opinion
of Nov. 12).
100. Jurisdiction of the European Danube Commission between Galatz and Bralia, 1927
P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 14 (Advisory Opinion of Dec. 8).
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IV. The Movements of Military Forces
A. In General
There are two situations in which the movement of military
forces can come into play in a collective security agreement. The
first arises when the parties prepare to exercise their individual or
collective rights to self-defense under the Charter of the United Na-
tions. The second arises when those rights are actually exercised.101
Provisions in collective security agreements governing both these sit-
uations, like other treaty provisions, are subject to interpretation.
Thus, the ability of state parties to mobilize their collective military
forces and to limit the movements of those forces pursuant to a se-
curity treaty must be determined by ascertaining the intentions of
the parties as expressed by the language of the treaty.
10 2
B. The Plain Meaning - "self help and mutual aid"
The degree of the United States' involvement in collective se-
curity treaties after World War II was based on provisions found in
Senate Resolution 239, adopted on June 11, 1948.103 The Resolution
was of a noncommital nature and provided in part for:
Progressive development of regional and other collective ar-
rangements for individual and collective self-defense in accor-
dance with the purposes, principles and provisions of the Charter
[of the United Nations].
Association of the United States with such regional and
other collective arrangements as are based on self-help and mu-
tual aid, and affect its national security.
1 0 4
As a consequence of this Resolution, the concept of "self-help
and mutual aid" was incorporated into all United States collective
security treaties concluded after 1948, including Article II of the
ANZUS Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United
States.
Article II of the ANZUS Treaty states "[i]n order more effec-
tively to achieve the objective of this Treaty the parties separately
and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mu-
tual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective ca-
pacity to resist armed attack."10 5
101. See, e.g., North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 30, at arts. 3 and 5.
102. See supra notes 55-75 and accompanying text.
103. GRENVILLE, supra note 2, at 306.
104. See supra note 3.
105. ANZUS Treaty, supra note 30, at art. II. For articles similar in nature to Article
II of the ANZUS Treaty, see U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, supra note 30, at art. III; SEATO
Treaty, supra note 30, at art. II; Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and Korea
(South), Oct. 10, 1953, United States-Korea, art. 11, 5 U.S.T. 2368, T.I.A.S. No. 3097 [herein-
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Looking at the language of this Article, its importance lies in
three phrases. First, the phrase beginning with "will maintain and
develop," is a phrase indicating an obligation to take action. It is a
phrase of certainty as "will" is a word of mandatory nature.0 6
"Maintain" necessarily involves a certain degree of positive action to
keep things in existence or continuance.10 7 While "develop" can pos-
sibly denote simply bringing something into existence, its placement
here after the word "maintain" joined by the conjunctive "and" indi-
cates that in this sense "develop" takes things beyond "maintain"
and toward a more advanced or effective state. 0 8 Under this lan-
guage, then, the parties would be obligated to take a minimum of
positive action.
The rest of the phrase beginning with "will maintain and de-
velop" defines the desired effect of the parties' positive action. The
effect of their action is to be on "their individual and collective ca-
pacity to resist armed attack." This may be indicative of the parties'
recognition of their right to take preparatory action pursuant to their
right to self-defense under the Charter of the United Nations. 9 The
use of "individual and collective" simply indicates that the obligation
to take action is mutual to the parties. 10 "Capacity" indicates that
the effect of the parties' action is to develop an ability to do some-
thing. Although no degree of ability is prescribed,"' the "capacity to
resist" means, at least, the development of an ability, to a degree, to
withstand the effect of an armed attack.1' 2 The nebulous character
of this standard makes a determination of the rights, duties and pow-
ers intended to be conferred on the parties by Article II difficult, if
not impossible to ascertain.
For the purpose of determining the extent of the parties' powers
to dictate movements of military forces, the second key phrase of
after cited as U.S.-Korea Treaty]; North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 30 at art. II.
106. "Will, v. An auxiliary verb commonly having the mandatory sense of 'shall' or
'must.'" It is a "word of certainty." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1433 (5th ed. 1979).
107. See 4 CENTURY DICTIONARY 3584 (1889); VI OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 52
(1933); II WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1362 (1966).
108. A definition of "develop" is "to bring into being," but the use in Article II of
"maintain" presupposes the existence of something. The conjunctive "and" indicates that "de-
velop" is to be with or in addition to "maintenance." It would be contradictory to state that
parties agree to "keep in existence" and in addition "to bring into existence," for the first
presupposes the second and so the second becomes surplusage. Since language is to be given
effect rather than be destroyed, the use of the word "develop" must indicate an intent to take
action toward a higher level of existence. See 2 CENTURY DICTIONARY 1577 (1889); 1II Ox-
FORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 280 (1933); 1 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTION-
ARY 330 (1966).
109. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
110. STARKE, supra note 44, at 102-03.
111. See I CENTURY DICTIONARY 802 (1889); II OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 89
(1933); I WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1932 (1966).
112. See 5 CENTURY DICTIONARY 5104 (1889); VIII OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
523 (1933); I1 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1932 (1966).
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Article II says "by means of continuous and effective self-help and
mutual aid." This is clearly an incorporation of the Vandenburg
Resolution of 1948, Senate Resolution 239.113 Even though it pre-
cedes the "maintain and develop" phrase, the Vandenburg phrase is
subordinate and defines the manner in which the action referred to
in the "maintain and develop" clause will be fulfilled. 4 This is the
means. "Self-help and mutual aid" recognizes that the obligations
under these treaties do not rest solely on the United States. Again,
the words "continuous and effective" connote a positive qualification
of the aid to be given - it should both go on continually and be of a
nature to produce the desired result,"'6 i.e., the capacity to resist
armed attack.
The importance of analyzing this language is to show its lack of
specificity. The obligations under this article are not reducible to
specific terms. No party is bound to make any specific contribution
to the defense capacity of any other party. There is no specific obli-
gation as to the nature or extent of assistance to be furnished. 1
The final key phrase of Article II, although last in the analysis
of defining the action to be taken, is foremost in defining the inten-
tion of the parties. It is the first phrase of Article II and serves to
qualify the purpose of the article. This phrase is not common to all
United States collective security agreements and it gains its impor-
tance through this uniqueness. The phrase states: "in order more ef-
fectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty . . . ." This indi-
cates the relation of the article to the objective of the Treaty.
Remembering that parties to a treaty are free to use language
however they wish,1 17 the qualification of the infinitive "to achieve"
stands out.118 "In order to achieve" would reasonably be the phras-
ing used to indicate that which is integral to achieve the objective of
the Treaty;1 9 it is unqualified and absolute. "In order effectively to
achieve" qualifies the infinitive "to achieve" to a degree which indi-
cates that achievement is possible through other means, but that this
means is an effective one. Then, to say "in order more effectively to
113. See supra text accompanying note 104.
114. This assumes that absent the "maintain and develop" clause there would be only
two interpretations of the manner in which Article II could be carried out. First, it could not
be carried out. Action could not exist without a means. Second, it could be carried out by any
manner agreed upon in good faith between the parties.
115. See 2 CENTURY DICTIONARY 1229, 1848 (1889); II OXFORD ENGLISH DICTION-
ARY 910 (1933); 111 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 48 (1933); 1 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW IN-
TERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 494, 724 (1966).
116. STARK, supra note 44, at 103.
117. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
118. This is so because the term "to achieve" is not consistently qualified throughout the
history of United States collective security agreements. See infra notes 120-27 and accompa-
nying text.
119. "In order to" indicates "for the purpose of." See VII OXFORD ENGLISH DICTION-
ARY 183 (1933); II WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1588 (1966).
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achieve" qualifies the already qualified "effectively to achieve" indi-
cating that not only is achievement possible through other means but
also through other effective means, relegating the means expressed in
the article as simply one among many "effective means" of achieving
the objective of the Treaty.
To understand fully the importance of the qualification of the
infinitive "to achieve" in determining the scope of the parties inten-
tion, it is necessary to compare the ANZUS Treaty with two other
treaties. Article III of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty states "[tihe
Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of
continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and
develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to
resist armed attack."'120 Article II of the U.S.-Korea Treaty states
"separately and jointly, by self-help and mutual aid, the parties will
maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack."12'
There was no qualification of the purpose of these clauses. There was
not even an explanation of the purpose; the clauses in the U.S.-Japan
and U.S.-Korea Treaties were straightforward and mandatory.
Both the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and the U.S.-Korea
Treaty contain another provision which differentiates them from the
usual collective security treaties entered into by the United States.
This provision grants the United States the right to move its military
forces in and about Japan and Korea. 2 Japan granted the United
States "the use by its land, air and naval of facilities and areas in
Japan." Korea granted the United States the "right to dispose
United States land, air and sea forces in and about the Territory of
the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement.' 24
By way of comparison, the North Atlantic Treaty does not ex-
pressly grant to any state the right to use military facilities. Instead,
it says specifically that the development of collective defense capaci-
ties through self-help and mutual aid is only "[Jin order more effec-
tively to achieve the objectives of [the] Treaty."'2 5 The SEATO
Treaty'26 and ANZUS Treaty127 are of a similar nature. They do
not grant the use of military facilities and they qualify the purpose
of "self-help and mutual aid."
120. U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, supra note 30, at art. III.
121. U.S.-Korea Treaty, supra note 105, at art. II.
122. One explanation for Japan's actions is that the Japanese government renounced
war as a sovereign right of their nation and also the threat of use of force as a means for
settling disputes. Japan's Constitution declares that "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other
war potential, will never be maintained." KENPO (Constitution) art. IX (Japan).
123. U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, supra note 30, at art. VI.
124. U.S.-Korea Treaty, supra note 105, at art. IV.
125. North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 30, at art. III (1st clause).
126. SEATO Treaty, supra note 30, at art. II.
127. ANZUS Treaty, supra note 30, at art. II; see supra notes 116-18 and accompany-
ing text.
Fall 19851
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
To reconcile these inconsistent developments in the United
States collective security treaties it is necessary to utilize a five step
analysis. First, assuming that the use of military facilities aids in
developing the capacity to resist armed attack, the act of granting
the right to use military facilities may be included as part of the
concept of "self-help and mutual aid." Second, to qualify the exis-
tence of "self-help and mutual aid" while granting an unqualified
use of military facilities would be a contradiction. Third, an unquali-
fied grant of the right to use military facilities defines that use as
integral to the achievement of the objective of the treaty, in the
minds of the parties. Fourth, where the grant of the right to use
military facilities is unqualified, the existence of "self-help and mu-
tual aid" must be unqualified. Last, then, where "self-help and mu-
tual aid" is qualified, the right to use military facilities cannot be
integral to the achievement of the objectives of the treaty but must
be considered as only one possible means toward that end.
It may be argued that denying the use of military facilities by
allies would be contrary to the essential purpose of collective security
treaties. In this respect it must be remembered that the purpose of
collective security treaties is the maintenance of international peace
and security, not the establishment of military alliances.' 28 The role
of the military in achieving that objective can clearly be expressed
through the use of appropriate language in the treaty. To assume
that the use of the military is the only means by which international
peace and security may be achieved is naive.
From the above analysis it is evident that the language of the
ANZUS Treaty is not specific in the obligations it creates. At a min-
imum it requires that the parties take action the specifics of which
are not defined. Allowing free movement of military forces may con-
ceivably be a part of the "self-help and mutual aid" clause, but it
does not rise to the level of an "obligation." According to the plain
meaning of the text of the Treaty, permitting the free movement of
military forces is merely one possible means toward achieving peace
and security.
C. Beyond the Plain Meaning - Implementing the Treaty
A textual analysis of the ANZUS Treaty reveals that the three
parties agreed to take action for the purpose of maintaining peace
and security in the Pacific area. But the specifics of that action were
not defined. It therefore becomes necessary to look beyond the lan-
guage of the Treaty to determine what the parties intended.1 29 This
128. See supra text accompanying note 30. The military alliance seeks coordination of
military efforts between nations.
129. See supra notes 77-100 and accompanying text. The process of looking beyond the
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analysis involves two steps: first, a look at the subsequent conduct of
the three parties as evidenced by the meetings of the ANZUS Coun-
cil and subsequent agreements entered into by the parties in refer-
ence to the ANZUS Treaty, and second, a study of the documenta-
tion surrounding the conclusion of the Treaty.
1. Subsequent Conduct.-In analyzing the subsequent conduct
it is necessary to look closely at the meetings of the ANZUS Council
and subsequent agreements between the parties.
(a) The ANZUS Council.-The council established under
the ANZUS Treaty was consultative in nature.13 0 The Treaty states
that the Council was "to consider matters concerning the implemen-
tation of [the] Treaty."' 1 "To consider" implies "to examine" or "to
inspect" but not "to decide." Therefore, the Council meetings were
not formal conferences but a medium for informal discussions be-
tween the parties.1 32 It is difficult from the Council meeting docu-
ments to determine with specificity the intentions of the parties con-
cerning the movement of military forces. Records and other formal
documents of the meetings were kept to a minimum.'33
It is clear, though, that the intention of the parties involved a
role for the military in implementing the Treaty. The Council regu-
larly received advice from high-level military representatives from
each of the three countries. 34 There is also documentation to the
effect that the Council considered it an overall objective of the par-
ties to strengthen their relationship at both the political and military
levels.
35
The parties' relationship was not always a strong one, how-
ever. "'36 In 1976 United States nuclear-powered vessels were allowed
to dock in Australia for the first time in four years, and in New
plain meaning of the text aids in the analysis of the text; it does not replace the text.
130. See supra note 38.
131. ANZUS Treaty, supra note 30, at art. VII; see also SEATO Treaty, supra note 30
at art. V (establishing the SEATO Council); North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 30 at art. 9
(establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Council).
132. STARKE, supra note 44, at 165.
133. Id. at 163, 167. The communiques are published in various issues of DEP'T ST.
BULL.
134. Council of ANZUS Communique, 27 DEP'T ST. BULL. 244, 245 (1952); see
STARKE, supra note 44, at 163.
135. ANZUS Council Discusses Security Problems of Pacific Area, 29 DEP'T ST. BULL.
414, 415 (1953).
136. Protest over United States military presence traces back to 1961. In that year there
was a large demonstration at the United States consulate in Australia protesting the possible
establishment of a Polaris missile submarine base in Western Australia. N.Y. Times, May 4,
1961, at A14, col. 8. In 1971 the United States found it necessary to open one of its classified
atmospheric observation stations to newsmen and student representatives in order to quell the
belief that the site's function was related to a worldwide American system for waging nuclear
war. N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1971, at A2, col. 4.
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Zealand for the first time in ten years. 3 7 In responding to these
problems, the ANZUS Council's reference to port calls may be sum-
marized by the word "cooperation." The Council members "ex-
pressed satisfaction at the degree of cooperation which existed be-
tween their armed forces.' 1 38 In addition, it was agreed that the
resumption of port calls was a "natural part of the cooperation
under the ANZUS Treaty."13 9
The key word there is "cooperation." To state that one is obli-
gated to cooperate would be a contradiction of terms. Cooperation
entails a willingness; obligation entails a duty. A duty to be willing
cannot be. Therefore, the language of the above-quoted communique
is evidence that permitting the movement of military forces cannot
be an obligation under the ANZUS Treaty in the minds of the
parties.
(b) Subsequent Agreements.-The second facet of the anal-
ysis of subsequent conduct involves a study of subsequent agree-
ments. To the extent an agreement was concluded in reference to a
treaty, it may aid in determining the parties' intentions. 40 Very few
subsequent agreements, however, were concluded between the parties
as a means of implementing the terms of the ANZUS Treaty.
While the terms of ANZUS were only infrequently imple-
mented through subsequent agreements, the SEATO Treaty has, to
date, resulted in no such implementation by subsequent agreement.
The North Atlantic Treaty, on the other hand, has involved exten-
sive implementation. Specific agreements have been entered into,
pursuant to Article 3141 of the North Atlantic Treaty, however, con-
cerning the stationing of forces within countries, 42 the use of mili-
tary facilities,4 s and the status of forces. " These agreements were
137. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1976, at A3, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1976, at A5,
col. I. The Labor parties in power for those four and ten-year periods, respectively, had insti-
tuted bans against nuclear ships.
138. Communique - 25th ANZUS, 75 DEP'T ST. BULL. 289, 290 (1976).
139. Id. at 291 (emphasis supplied).
140. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. This represents objective evidence
as to the intention of the parties under the language of the treaty. For subsequent agreements
under the ANZUS Treaty, see e.g., Naval Communications Station, May 9, 1963, United
States-Australia, 14 U.S.T. 908, T.I.A.S. No. 5377; Status of Forces, May 9, 1963 United
States-Australia, 14 US.T. 506, T.I.A.S. No. 5349; Loan of Vessel, June 8, 1962, United
States-New Zealand, 13 U.S.T. 1273, T.I.A.S. No. 5075; Mutual Defense Assistance, June 19,
1952, United States-New Zealand, 3 U.S.T. 4408, T.I.A.S. No. 2509.
141. "In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, sepa-
rately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain
and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack." North Atlantic
Treaty, supra note 30, at art. 3.
142. See, e.g., Stationing of United States Armed Forces in the Netherlands, Aug. 13,
1954, United States-Netherlands, 6 U.S.T. 103, T.I.A.S. No. 3174; Defense of Iceland Pursu-
ant to North Atlantic Treaty, May 5, 1951, United States-Iceland, 2 U.S.T. 1195, T.I.A.S. No.
2266.
143. See, e.g., Agreement Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of
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concluded with regard to the parties' responsibilities to develop their
collective capacity to resist armed attack.
14 5
Given that Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty is virtually
identical to Article II of the ANZUS Treaty,'14 two conclusions may
be drawn. First, the movement of military forces under the ANZUS
Treaty could be identical to that defined under the North Atlantic
Treaty since virtually identical language is used. Alternatively, mili-
tary movement under the ANZUS Treaty could be interpreted to
not be identical to that defined under the North Atlantic Treaty be-
cause of the distinct lack of similar subsequent agreements.
The next step in looking beyond the plain meaning to analyze
the intentions of the parties to a treaty is the study of the informa-
tion surrounding the implementation of the treaty.
2. Information Surrounding the Implementation of the
Treaty.-The overriding concern of the members of the New Zea-
land Parliament after the signing of the ANZUS Treaty was the
possibility of resurgent Japanese militarism. 147  The Treaty was
viewed as both offsetting the risk of rearming Japan and as an in-
ducement to those factions that had previously objected to agree to
the Japanese Peace Treaty. It was felt also by the members of the
New Zealand government that the Treaty would not materially af-
fect, positively or negatively, the status quo in the Pacific.
148
The record of the New Zealand Parliamentary debates indicates
Greece Concerning Military Facilities, Oct. 12, 1953, United States-Greece, 4 U.S.T. 2189,
T.I.A.S. 2868; Defense of Iceland Pursuant to North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 142.
144. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding
the Status of their Forces, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. 2846; 199 U.N.T.S. 67.
145. See id. at preamble para. 10.
146. The only difference in the language is that the ANZUS Treaty says "objective"
while the North Atlantic Treaty says "objectives."
147. See 297 N.Z. PARL. DEB. (2d ses.) 424 (1952); 295 N.Z. PARL. DEB. (1st ses.) 6,
193-99, 205, 210, 241, 258, 275, 280, 287-88, 339, 349, 463 (1951). See also supra notes 46-
48 and accompanying text.
148. A member of the New Zealand Parliament stated on October 10, 1951:
It is beyond the wildest hopes that at the present time in the Pacific we
could institute a general pact of any real value, but by this small treaty between
the three countries directly involved we have had guaranteed by America - the
greatest military power on earth today - the safety of our back door ...
I believe that the Tripartite Pact [ANZUS Treaty] amply justifies the deci-
sion of this Government to take the risk of joining in giving Japan once more her
freedom.
295 N.Z. PARL. DEB. (1st ses.) 258 (1951).
On October 9, 1951 Sir Walter Nash, then leader of the opposition Labour Party in New
Zealand, stated "[o]n the evidence [the Treaty] does not mean much. It has not the same bite
in its clauses as have the clauses in the North Atlantic Treaty." Id. at 205. One member of the
New Zealand Parliament, added "I think the Tripartite Pact [ANZUS Treaty] is largely a
sop given by America to Australia and New Zealand as an additional inducement to sign the
peace treaty as it exists. The treaty places no restrictions whatever on Japan, militarily, indus-
trially, or commercially, and it provides no reparations." Id. at 210. Another representative,
stated "1 myself cannot really believe that a treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and
America could be superior to the policy of the United Nations . I..." d. at 241.
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that the Parliament believed the ANZUS Treaty was intended as a
mutual pledge to render assistance "in event of attack."149 The Par-
liament recognized that the Treaty "obligated [the Parties] to do
certain things" but did not "obligate [the parties] to use force, as is
the case under the North Atlantic Treaty." 150 It was argued that it
would not be good to place a heavy emphasis on military means of
achieving security.11 The New Zealand Parliament was hesitant
about entering into a close alliance with the United States, fearing
that it would diminish New Zealand's relationship with Great Brit-
ain.1 52 As a result of the above-stated considerations, the ANZUS
Treaty was clearly not intended to be as entangling as the North
Atlantic Treaty.
V. Conclusion 6"
In the final analysis, George Washington's warning that "there
can be no greater error than to expect, or calculate upon real favours
from Nation to Nation" bears significant relevance to twentieth cen-
tury collective security treaties. The parties' actions under the collec-
tive security relationship are defined not by "favours" expected by
one party or granted by another but by the intention of the parties as
expressed through the language of the treaty.
149. Id. at 7, 195, 241.
150. Id. at 205.
151. On October 16, 1951, one member of the New Zealand parliament stated:
It is psychologically a bad moment to put the accent on military means of
achieving security in the Pacific. Such emphasis tends to make us think of East
Asia as a territory in which it may be necessary for Western soldiers to fight,
instead of as a home of new nations with whom it is certainly necessary for us to
learn to live.
295 N.Z. PARL. DEB. (1st ses.) 339 (1951).
152. Id. at 205, 280, 287-88. But cf. 297 N.Z. PARL. DEB. (2d ses.) 3 (1952) (the Treaty
will reinforce New Zealand's ability to pursue the well being of the British Commonwealth);
295 N.Z. PARL. DEB. (lst ses.) 7 (1951) (Treaty considered important advance for the partner
nations of the British Commonwealth).
153. Since the writing of this comment New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange for- -
mally signaled that his country would break away from the ANZUS alliance if that treaty
were interpreted to require the presence of nuclear weapons in New Zealand. On September
27, 1985 in a major foreign policy speech to the ruling Labor Party's regional council in
Christchurch, Lange stated:
If the ANZUS Treaty requires us to accept nuclear weapons, then it is the
treaty which is an obstacle to the maintenance of good relations between New
Zealand and the United States.
If the ANZUS alliance is merely a nuclear deterrent and New Zealand's
contribution to ANZUS in the form of the presence of nuclear weapons is the
price we pay for that deterrent, then the price is too high.
Wash. Post, Sept. 28, 1985, at A16, col. 1.
One attempt at a solution to the port access dispute had already fallen through. The New
Zealand government had made a proposal to the United States which would have given Prime
Minister Lange the authority to determine whether a visiting ship was nuclear-armed or pow-
ered without the need to ask for United States clarification. The United States rejected this
proposal and stated that it would review New Zealand's status as an ally if the antinuclear
policy was codified into law. Id.
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As evidenced by this analysis of the ANZUS Treaty and the
comparison of the ANZUS Treaty with other major security agree-
ments, the ability of allies to place limits on the movements of
United States military forces is defined more by subsequent agree-
ments to the collective security treaties than by the language of the
treaties themselves.
The text of the average collective security treaty places no spe-
cific obligations on any party absent specific language. As in the
cases of Korea and Japan, collective security treaties will not entail a
right to the movement of military forces within an ally's territory
unless such a right is expressly granted. In all other cases an ally
may limit the movements of military forces because they are only
one means of achieving the peace and security for which collective
security treaties strive.
Accordingly, where there is no specific grant of the right to
move military forces within an ally's territory, subsequent agree-
ments, if any, determine that ability. It was at this level of interpre-
tation that the ANZUS Treaty was distinguished from treaties per-
mitting unlimited movement of military forces. Unlike the North
Atlantic Treaty, which was supplemented by subsequent agreements
granting the United States the right to move military forces within
allies' territory, the scope of the ANZUS Treaty was not expanded
by analogous subsequent agreements. This absence of supplemental
agreements providing for unlimited troop movement evidences a lack
of intention on the part of the ANZUS parties to obligate one an-
other to use their military forces. The ability of the United States to
move its military within an ally's territory is not prohibited. The
Treaty simply does not establish the freedom to move forces into an
ally's territory as a specific right.
New Zealand does have the power, under the ANZUS relation-
ship, to deny port access to United States Navy ships. That power
exists because the ANZUS Treaty places no specific obligations on
the parties. It only obligates them to take some action. The lack of
specificity in the language of the Treaty together with the lack of a
more specific definition of the parties' obligations by subsequent
agreement leads to the conclusion that the parties intended a lack of
specificity. While the use of the military action in the North Atlantic
areas has been made an integral aspect of the North Atlantic rela-
tionship, the United States' use of New Zealand ports was calculated
"upon real favours" from new Zealand. "[N]o greater error" indeed.
Ricky K. Jones
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